Pierre-Yves Péneau

Pierre-Yves Péneau

Security Analyst

Riscure B.V.

Biography

I am a security analyst at Riscure B.V. in the Netherlands. Previously, I was at the French Institute for Computer Science (INRIA), specificaly at the High Security Laboratory. I was in charge of developing a new platform dedicated to fault injection through clock glitches. I received my PhD from the University of Montpellier in October 2018, and my MSc from the Pierre and Marie Curie University (now Sorbonne Universités).

My research interests include fault injection, side-channel attack, embedded systems and computer architecture.

Interests
  • Hardware security
  • Fault injection
  • Side channel attack
  • Computer architecture
Education

  • PhD in Computer Science, 2018

    Montpellier University

  • MSc in Computer Science, 2015

    La Sorbonne University

  • BSc in Computer Science, 2013

    Nantes University

Latest experience

 
 
 
 
 
Riscure B.V.
Security Analyst
Riscure B.V.
Nov 2021 – Present Delft, Netherlands
 
 
 
 
 
French National Institute For Scientific Research
Hardware Security Engineer
French National Institute For Scientific Research
Jan 2019 – Sep 2021 Rennes, France
Setting up a new fault injection platform based on clock glitches
 
 
 
 
 
French National Centre for Scientific Research
PhD candidate
French National Centre for Scientific Research
Oct 2015 – Oct 2018 Montpellier, France
Integration of emerging non-volatile memory technologies in cache hierarchy for improving energy-efficiency

Recent publications

Pierre-Yves Péneau, Ludovic Claudepierre, Damien Hardy, Erven Rohou (2020). NOP-Oriented Programming: Should we Care?. In EuroS&PW.

PDF Cite Code Slides

Pierre-Yves Péneau, David Novo, Florent Bruguier, Lionel Torres, Gilles Sassatelli, Abdoulaye Gamatié (2019). Performance and Energy Impact of Enhanced Cache Replacement Policy on STT-MRAM LLC.

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Featured Publication

Ludovic Claudepierre, Pierre-Yves Péneau, Damien Hardy, Erven Rohou
May 2021 In AsiaCCS
TRAITOR: A Low-Cost Evaluation Platform for Multifault Injection

Fault injection is a well-known method to physically attack embedded systems, microcontrollers in particular. It aims to find and exploit vulnerabilities in the hardware to induce malfunction in the software and eventually bypass software security or retrieve sensitive information. We propose a low-cost platform called TRAITOR inducing faults with clock glitches with the capacity to inject numerous and precise bursts of faults. From an evaluation point of view, this platform allows easier and cheaper investigations over complex attacks than costly EMI benches or laser probes.
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Contact

  • Delftechpark 49, Delft, 2628 XJ, The Netherlands
  • Monday-Friday 09:00 to 18:00